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Abstract
Background: Public health concerns relating to international investment liberalization have centred on the potential
for investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS)-related regulatory chill. However, the broader political and economic
dimensions that shape the relationship between the international investment regime and non-communicable disease
(NCD) policy development have been less well explored. This review aimed to synthesise the available evidence using
a political economy approach, to understand why, how and under what conditions transnational corporations may use
the international investment regime to promote NCD prevention policy non-decisions.
Main body: Methods: Mechanisms explaining why/how the international investment regime may be used by
transnational health-harmful commodity corporations (THCCs) to encourage NCD prevention policy non-decisions,
including regulatory chill, were iteratively developed. Six databases and relevant grey literature was searched, and
evidence was extracted, synthesized and mapped against the various proposed explanatory mechanisms.
Findings: Eighty-nine sources were included. THCCs may be incentivised to use the ISDS mechanism since the costs
may be outweighed by the benefits of even just delaying regulatory adoption, particularly since the chilling effect
tends to ripple out across jurisdictions. Drivers of regulatory chill may include ambiguity in treaty terms, inconsistency
in arbitral rulings, potential arbitrator bias and the high cost of arbitration. Evidence indicates ISDS can delay policy
adoption both within the country directly involved but also in other jurisdictions. Additionally, governments are
adopting standard assessments of public health regulatory proposals for trade and ISDS risk. Various economic, political
and industry-related factors likely interact to increase (or decrease) the ultimate risk of regulatory chill. Some evidence
indicates that THCCs take advantage of governments’ prioritization of foreign investment over NCD prevention
objectives to influence the NCD prevention regulatory environment.
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Conclusions: While ISDS-related regulatory chill is a real risk under certain conditions, international investment-related
NCD prevention policy non-decisions driven by broader political economy dynamics may well be more widespread
and impactful on NCD regulatory environments. There is therefore a clear need to expand the research agenda on
investment liberalization and NCD policy beyond regulatory chill and engage with theories and approaches from
international relations and political science, including political economy and power analyses.
Keywords: Investment liberalization, Foreign investment, Non-communicable diseases, Regulatory chill, Political
economy of health
Background
It is well known that tobacco, alcohol and unhealthy di-
ets are key risk factors for non-communicable diseases
(NCDs) which now account for more than 70% of global
deaths annually. Over 85% of preventable NCD deaths
occur in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) [1].
However, as markets for harmful products saturate in
high-income countries (HICs), investment into the alco-
hol, ultra-processed food (UPF) and, in some cases, to-
bacco sector is increasing in many LMICs, particularly
in Asia [2, 3]. This investment allows corporations en-
gaged in the production, distribution and sale of UPF, al-
cohol and tobacco to reduce production costs, gain
efficiencies in distribution, and sell their products at a
low cost domestically [4]. Foreign direct investment
(FDI) has consequently been associated with increased
consumption of health-harmful products in a number of
LMICs [5–9]. Public health measures to reduce con-
sumption of these products are in direct tension with
the financial objectives of the corporations producing
them. As such, these corporations (referred to in this
work as transnational health harmful commodity corpo-
rations or THCCs) may be increasingly interested in
maintaining a limited regulatory environment in these
countries. The relevance of understanding the linkages
between the liberalization of cross-border capital flows
and FDI, growth in the size and transnational reach of
multinational corporations, and NCD prevention policy
non-decisions is therefore increasingly pertinent. Non-
decisions are defined in this work as a voluntary decision
not to act; an involuntary failure to act; or inaction due
to a psychological boundary issue [10].
Concern from the public health community regarding
international investment liberalization has largely fo-
cused on the ISDS mechanism found in more than 3500
international investment agreements (IIAs) and in over
60 trade agreements including regional and more re-
cently negotiated large multi-lateral trade agreements
[11]. The ISDS mechanism provides a pathway for for-
eign corporations to bypass domestic courts and bring
claims for financial compensation against states in pri-
vate international tribunals when a corporation perceives
state action has compromised their investment [12, 13].
ISDS originates from efforts by former colonial powers
and international organizations, particularly the World
Bank, to maintain influence within newly independent
and developing countries [14] and multinational corpo-
rations have widely lobbied for its inclusion in IIAs and
trade agreements. Public health concerns have centred
around the potential for ISDS to be used by THCCs to
block new policies aimed at protecting public health or
to generate ‘regulatory chill’, a specific type of policy
non-decision where a government fails to regulate in the
public interest in a timely and effective manner due to a
high perceived threat of investment arbitration [12, 15–
18]. As such, IIAs potentially provide THCCs with veto
power over domestic public health policy decisions [12].
Despite significant recent debates and steps by some
countries to reduce their exposure to ISDS, the mechan-
ism remains a standard model for resolving international
investment disputes [19].
Public health concern relating to ISDS has not been
unwarranted. In 2010 Phillip Morris International filed a
dispute against Uruguay (under an agreement with
Switzerland) for their tobacco graphic warning labelling
regulations. The following year Philip Morris Asia initi-
ated a dispute against Australia (under an IIA with Hong
Kong) for their proposed standardized tobacco pack-
aging [20, 21]. While the food and alcohol industry have
not yet utilized the ISDS mechanism, there is evidence
that they are increasingly adopting tobacco industry
strategies to influence policymaking [22]. Notably,
LMICs may be particularly vulnerable to an investment-
related chilling effect on progressive public health policy.
Reasons for this potentially include their exposure
through IIAs with HICs where the majority of THCCs
are domiciled, increasing investment by THCCs in
LMICs and the limited administrative, legal technical
and financial resources held by LMICs to successfully
navigate an investor-state dispute.
A body of literature analysing the potential regulatory
chilling effect of IIA obligations on health policy deci-
sions is developing. A 2018 critical review by Schram
et al. including 33 articles, outlined the methodological
approaches used to study investment dispute-related
regulatory chill, described the existing state of know-
ledge on the issue and developed a conceptual frame-
work of the internalization of IIAs in public policy [23].
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However, the broader political and economic
dimensions that shape the relationship between the
international investment regime and NCD policy devel-
opment have been less well explored. This work argues
that adopting a political economy approach may provide
further nuance to understanding how, why and under
what circumstances the international investment regime
may facilitate certain actors to advance their interests
within NCD policy decision-making not only instrumen-
tally (e.g., via threats of investor-state disputes) but also
structurally (e.g., by appealing to governments’ interest
in attracting foreign investment).
The aim of this realist review therefore, is to synthesise
the available evidence to understand why, how and
under what conditions international investment
liberalization may facilitate THCC influence over NCD
prevention policy and to identify potential recommenda-
tions for minimizing such influence. While evidence is
included from countries across all income groups, the
focus, where possible, is on LMICs since they have be-
come the focus for expansion by many THCCs [24–27]
but may have limited capacity – financial, institutional,
technical and/or strategic – to resist attempts by
THCCs’ to influence health policy processes [28].
Main text
Methods
The realist review is one of the few mixed review
methods that offers a "systematic integration of contextual
analysis in order to better understand how interventions
produce outcomes" [29]. This approach was therefore
considered useful for providing insight into not only if
international investment liberalization has affected NCD
prevention policy action, but also how, why and under
what circumstances.
The review was conducted according to a protocol
broadly based on Pawson’s five iterative stages: identify-
ing and articulating the explanatory theories; searching
for and appraising the evidence; extracting the data;
synthesizing the evidence; and drawing conclusions [30].
The reporting of this review adheres to RAMSES publi-
cation standards [31].
Initial scope of the literature and explanatory theory
development
An initial rapid scoping review of relevant international
investment and health policy literature was conducted
using concept searches, e.g. ‘regulatory/policy chill’ and
‘policy space’ in Scopus and Google Scholar. Citation
tracking and snowballing was subsequently also used
and grey literature was searched. Relevant explanatory
information from different sources was interpreted and
synthesized in an iterative process of preliminary theory
development.
Searching and appraising the evidence
Main search A systematic search of the literature was
conducted to identify the most relevant evidence to
either support or dispute the initial set of explanatory
theories. The final search strategy used a combination
of search and indexed terms for the concepts of
international trade and investment liberalization, regu-
latory chill, policy process, relevant transnational cor-
porations and three public health policy areas:
tobacco control, alcohol regulation and nutrition
(Supplementary Text I) [10]. These concepts were de-
veloped iteratively by repeated testing and reviewing
of search results in MEDLINE, development/refine-
ment of explanatory theories and subsequent further
concept development [10]. The search terms were
then developed through repeated testing in six data-
bases: MEDLINE, Global Health, Econlit, SCOPUS,
Web of Science and PubMed.
Database searches were undertaken in January 2020
and limited to English language publications from 1st
January 2008 to 15th January 2020. It was judged rea-
sonable to limit the search from 2008 onwards given the
only more recent interest in international investment
treaties by public health researchers. Citation tracking
and bibliography searching was conducted on studies of
particular relevance to theory development [10].
A search for relevant grey literature was also conducted
in Google and Google Scholar and online repositories of
the World health Organization, World Trade Organization
(WTO), United Nations Conference on Trade and Devel-
opment (UNCTAD) and International Institute of Sustain-
able Development [10]. All articles were downloaded to an
Endnote database and duplicates removed.
Inclusion criteria Inclusion criteria were consistent
with Pawson’s approach that the decision be based on
the article’s relevance to program theories and explana-
tory potential; whether it contains discernible ‘nuggets’
of evidence; and evidence of trustworthiness with no art-
icle excluded based on a single aspect of quality [32].
The criteria applied are outlined in Table 1.
Selection and appraisal of documents Electronic
searches yielded 1585 results. A further 55 sources were
identified through citation tracking, bibliography and
grey literature searches. After removing duplicates, 995
unique sources remained. Following the realist approach
and due to the limited literature, an intentionally
inclusive approach was taken throughout the selection
process [10].
Articles underwent a preliminary screening of their ti-
tles and abstracts using the inclusion criteria (Table 1).
Commentaries, editorials, opinion pieces, conference
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abstracts, and data-free models/frameworks were ex-
cluded (unless based on empirical evidence or providing
key anecdotal evidence) [10]. After a scoping of included
literature, this review was narrowed to include just the
impact of international investment treaties on the three
policy areas (international trade is explored separately
[10]). The first reviewer’s screen subsequently resulted
in 138 texts being retained for full-text review.
Full texts were retrieved for 133 of the 138 articles.
Five articles were not retrievable. The 133 full texts were
again assessed for relevance based on the test for inclu-
sion. Full-text review resulted in exclusion of a further
44 articles giving 89 relevant articles (Fig. 1).
Ten percent of the articles were reviewed by the second re-
viewer both at the preliminary screening and full text review
stages. There was 100% inter-reviewer agreement on eviden-
tial relevance and study quality at both stages and the
remaining texts were assessed for inclusion by the first re-
viewer only.
Information on study characteristics (e.g. study type, meth-
odological approach, health issues covered) and the rationale
for final inclusion/exclusion in the realist synthesis was docu-
mented on a screening tool (Supplementary Text II) adapted
from a similar set of constructs [33]. It was not possible to
apply a single recognized quality appraisal assessment tool to
all included articles due to the diversity of disciplines and
methods used. Instead, following the realist approach, the
focus was on assessing each nugget of relevant evidence
identified within an article for its reliability and relevance to
theory development [10].
Data extraction, analysis and synthesis processes
The final 89 articles included in the synthesis were imported
into NVivo (QSR International). ‘Nodes’ were generated for
each preliminary explanatory theory. Data considered useful
for theory development, including data that supported or
challenged preliminary theories and relevant contextual fac-
tors, were extracted by the first reviewer. New nodes were
generated as additional useful theories emerged and relevant
data extracted. The data extracted under each node were
imported into a Word document for analysis and synthesis.
Table 1 Inclusion criteria
Include the article if
• It contains ‘nuggets’ of evidence that provide insight into the review
questions, such that even where the aims of the study diverge from
the main focus of this review, if a ‘nugget’ of evidence relevant to the
review questions is provided, this article is included.
AND
• It is assessed to go beyond a superficial description or commentary, i.e.
is a competent attempt at research, enquiry, investigation or study 58.
This can include qualitative studies using key informant interviews and
policy document reviews, surveys, expert legal analyses, case studies,
reviews of primary research (if the method was stated) or descriptive
models/frameworks (if based on primary data).
Exclude the article if
• The focus is on agricultural policy, food safety, genetically modified
foods/GM food labelling, or biotechnology.
• It analyses trade and/or investment agreements or an ISDS/WTO
dispute but does not also explicitly analyze the impacts (or potential
impacts) on health policy processes (prospectively or retrospectively)
OR on policy space
• It examines how trade and/or investment liberalization impacted on
health determinants and outcomes but not on health policy processes.
• Books and book chapters.
Fig. 1 Screening flow diagram
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Results
The 89 articles selected for inclusion in the synthesis
spanned different disciplines including public health,
international law and political science. Articles varied in
design and quality and included analyses of investment
protection chapters and provisions; analyses of investor-
state disputes; surveys and key informant interviews
investigating policy-makers’ consideration of investment
protection obligations in policy decision-making pro-
cesses; case-studies of potential regulatory chill re-
sponses; and critical analyses of industry and policy
documents.
We identified a very limited number of empirical
analyses. A major reason for this is likely to be the
significant challenges associated with studying policy
non-decisions. In addition, our enquiry was inherently
multi-disciplinary in nature with legal, political and
social science research providing valuable insights. For
these reasons analyses based on expert opinion and
deductive reasoning as well as empirical studies were
included. Notably, analysis of contextual factors was not
included as a primary research objective in any of the
studies and contextual factors were typically only dis-
cussed superficially.
Political and economic drivers of international
investment-related NCD prevention policy non-decisions
Very limited empirical research was identified that pri-
marily or explicitly explored the more political and eco-
nomic dimensions of how international investment
liberalization may shape actor interests and priorities in
ways that affect NCD policy.
The neoliberal paradigm is based on the premise that
free, open and competitive markets will achieve eco-
nomic growth, development and shared prosperity [34].
Privatization and liberalization of cross-border capital
flows are key elements of neoliberal policy reform [35].
While the relationship between neoliberal reforms and
FDI into developing countries is complex, private foreign
investment is often, although not always, considered by
governments to be a fundamental source of employ-
ment, production (and specifically for food, more effi-
cient and reliable supply chains [4]), technology transfer,
tax revenue [4, 13] and economic growth. As such,
attracting FDI has been identified as a key pillar of the
economic development plan in many LMICs, including
investment into the processed food, alcohol and, in some
cases, tobacco sectors [4]. In their 2018 study, Thow and
colleagues found that a dominant ‘Economic Growth’
policy coalition in South Africa held the core belief that
employment and economic growth were the primary
mechanisms to achieve food and nutrition security [36].
This coalition’s neoliberally-aligned perspective was
found to dominate in South Africa’s policy documents
governing the food supply. For example, the authors
point out that the National Development Plan 2030 in-
cludes objectives to increase investment in the agro-
processing sector (of which food is a major sub-division)
as a means of increasing the production of value-added
processed goods and employment, despite national pub-
lic health goals of reducing obesity and diet-related
NCDs [36].
Given many governments’ belief that FDI from private
corporations is critical to job creation and economic de-
velopment, there is considerable scope for THCC’s ac-
cess to, and influence within, political decision-making
spaces to significantly expand [4, 9]. Governments may
also be independently willing to refrain from regulating
in relation to THCC activities and products in order to
attract FDI. Case study evidence supporting this theory
was identified in several analyses. In 1995 when Uzbeki-
stan’s domestic tobacco company was privatized in a
deal with British American Tobacco (BAT), the company
delayed completing its investment (the largest single
source of FDI into the country) until proposed regulations
(including a ban on tobacco advertising and smoking in
public places and health warnings on packages) were re-
placed with BAT’s voluntary advertising code and
cigarette excise tax rates were reduced by 50% [9, 37, 38].
BAT was also identified as having attempted to influence
cigarette tax policy in various countries it sought to invest
in with documented efforts in Hungary, Belarus, Ukraine,
Kyrgyzstan and Cambodia and other TNCs secured simi-
lar concessions as conditions of investment [9, 39]. Sarnit-
sart (2008) reports on documents explaining that when
the Laotian Government sold its domestic tobacco mon-
opoly to a foreign investor, a stabilisation clause in the
contract committed the government to freezing excise tax
on tobacco products for 25 years [40].
In their analysis of Nigerian tobacco control policy,
Oladepo and colleagues (2018) report that in 2001 the
Nigerian government signed a memorandum of under-
standing with BAT Nigeria to make an investment of
150 million USD to build a state-of-the-art factory, im-
prove the quality and quantity of locally grown tobacco
and develop potential for regional export [41]. Following
this there was a 10-year gap between Nigeria’s ratifica-
tion of the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
(FCTC) in 2005 and the formulation and passage into
law of a comprehensive tobacco bill in 2015 [41]. In a
2018 study by Lencucha and colleagues, Malawi tobacco
control advocates reported that Japan Tobacco Inter-
national, which has significant investment in manufac-
turing in the country, was driving Malawi’s tobacco
policy agenda [42].
One study was identified indicating that threat of for-
eign investor flight may also promote NCD preven-
tion policy non-decisions. Mialon et al. (2016) found
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that when the Fijian government suggested regulating
the food supply to create a healthier food environment,
food companies threatened to move their investments out
of Fiji and claimed that jobs would be lost. This was re-
ported to result in the government deciding not to pursue
such policy options [43].
For THCCs, FDI, as opposed to trade, is considered the
preferred and primary method for entering new markets
since it can be more cost-effective than exporting prod-
ucts, it avoids trade barriers, optimises the effectiveness of
branding and promotional activities and can rapidly assist
them to gain market dominance [5, 44]. For example, one
study included in the analysis indicated that investment
liberalization through NAFTA resulted in huge accelera-
tions of FDI from American processed food corporations
into Mexico and, various transnational food corporations
have used FDI to expand into LMICs globally [44]. Other
literature included descriptions of how transnational to-
bacco companies (TTCs) have used FDI to gain access
into LMICs markets by way of joint ventures or leaf devel-
opment agreements with state-owned/local companies
and the establishment of manufacturing facilities, includ-
ing in Malawi, Nigeria, Mozambique, Uganda, Zimbabwe
and South Africa [37, 45]. In their 2008 case study of
Vietnam, Lee and colleagues document how BAT took ad-
vantage of the government’s "need" for FDI to negotiate
an advantageous joint venture partnership [46].
Once dependent on foreign capital, TTCs have ac-
quired local companies to take control of the market in
a number of developing countries, including Cambodia
and Vietnam and various Former Soviet countries [37].
During the 1990s TTCs made similar acquisitions of
state-owned tobacco companies in Sub-Saharan Africa
including RJ Reynolds in Tanzania, and Japan Tobacco
International in both Malawi then later in 2011 in Sudan
[45]. Transnational alcohol companies have undertaken
similar takeovers. For example through a number of
share acquisition deals, Diageo became the majority
shareholder in India’s United Spirits Limited, taking a
leadership position in the Indian alcohol market [47].
Diageo and SABMilller, two of the world’s largest alco-
hol corporations, have made significant strategic invest-
ments in production hubs across LMICs [48]. THCCs also
tend to invest at multiple points in a product’s supply
chain. While supply chains are often global, they can also
exist largely in just one country, for example Coca Cola
has invested in cane sugar refinement, beverage produc-
tion, bottling and refrigeration of sugar-sweetened bever-
ages in Brazil alone [4]. The cross-border investment
practices of THCCs described, are likely to have contrib-
uted to the accumulation of vast material resources by
THCCs. We suggest this in turn translates into material
power that THCCs can use to influence regulatory envi-
ronments in their host countries.
Drivers of ISDS-related NCD prevention regulatory chill
The majority of literature on international investment
and health policy identified in this review focused on
ISDS-related regulatory chill. The threat of an investor-
state dispute can be used by THCCs as a mechanism to
potentially prevent or stall NCD prevention regulatory
development at a relatively low cost [12, 49]. Hawkins
and Holden (2016) argue that this strategy of influence
becomes particularly relevant when THCC legitimacy
declines and their access to policymaking spaces is lim-
ited, prompting them to claim alternative spaces of influ-
ence [12]. Where investor-state disputes are in fact
brought, THCCs effectively shift health policy decision-
making to private international arbitrators residing
within international investment legal venues, where
THCCs interests may be prioritised [50, 51]. THCCs
have strongly supported both the proliferation of IIAs
and more recently have lobbied for the inclusion of in-
vestment chapters, and specifically ISDS, in multilateral
trade agreements. For example, before the US withdrew
from the agreement, Phillip Morris International submit-
ted comments to the US Trade Representative indicating
its support for protection of investor rights in the Trans-
pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA), describing the
ISDS provision as "vital" [4, 13, 49].
Incentives for THCCs to use ISDS
In their 2013 analysis, Ty points out that there are min-
imal restrictions on the initiation of an investment dis-
pute under the majority of IIAs giving THCCs wide
discretion to file claims [52]. Others suggest that pursu-
ing an investor-state challenge, regardless of ultimate
success, may be in the corporate interest, since the eco-
nomic value of simply delaying policy implementation
via lengthy legal processes may outweigh the expense as-
sociated with the arbitration itself [13, 53]. This is sup-
ported by evidence that despite repeated legal advice
that the TRIPS agreement provided no protection
against tobacco health warning labelling or plain pack-
aging, tobacco companies continued to threaten that ex-
propriation of the companies’ intellectual property
would result in significant financial damages. Crosbie
and Glantz (2014) argue this “delayed the progress on
large graphic health warning labels and plain packaging
for over a decade” [54]. When plain packaging was again
on the agenda in 2011, Phillip Morris continued to use
the same unsupported TRIPS-based argument and even-
tually initiated an investor-state dispute on these
grounds [49]. Australia and Uruguay’s tobacco control-
related ISDS cases lasted for four and 6 years, respect-
ively [17], causing significant delays in policy adoption.
Further incentive for THCCs to proceed to an
investor-state dispute comes from evidence of its ripple
effect across jurisdictions. A number of analyses pointed
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out that by strategically targeting countries attempting
to introduce precedential public health policy, THCCs
may prevent a so-called domino effect regionally and
globally [12, 51, 53]. Gruszczynski (2014) for example ar-
gues that the key motivation for transnational tobacco
corporations’ particularly aggressive opposition to plain
packaging in Australia, including through an investor-
state dispute, “is the precedential nature of the new law
and a fear that the packaging requirements will be cop-
ied in other jurisdictions”. Gruszczynski goes on to state
that, given Australia’s strong legal position, the tobacco
industry’s “approach sends a strong signal to other coun-
tries contemplating the introduction of plain packaging
laws that any such initiative may be challenged. This in
turn can have a chilling effect on national regulatory ini-
tiatives of other states” [53]. This argument is supported
by reports that a number of countries delayed adoption
of standardized packaging during this time [17, 53].
Conversely, THCCs may exercise a degree of caution in
proceeding to investment arbitration since it carries the
risk that their arguments will be dismissed as illegitim-
ate, undermining future use of such arguments in lobby-
ing activities [49].
Ambiguity of international investment agreement rules
A number of analyses also identified that in threatening
or pursing an investor-state dispute, corporations take
advantage of ambiguity in the definition of key terms/
obligations within IIAs. Such ambiguity effectively
broadens the scope of investment protection and there-
fore the number of opportunities for THCCs to chal-
lenge regulations, including those related to harmful
products [13, 52, 55–61]. ‘Investment’ itself is also de-
fined very broadly in most investment treaties [17]. In
NAFTA (replaced in 2020 by the United States-Mexico-
Canada Agreement), and also in more recent agreements
including the Comprehensive and Progressive Agree-
ment for Transpacific Partnership (CPTPP) signed be-
tween 11 Pacific rim countries (after the US withdrew
from the TPPA), investment is defined as applying to
any assets characterised by "a commitment of capital or
other resources, expectation of gain or profit, or assump-
tion of risk" [62–64]. Mitchell and Wurzberger (2011)
argue that this makes it very difficult for a country to
avoid investment arbitration on the basis that a THCC
bringing a claim does not have a relevant investment
[62]. The CPTPP’s broad definition could potentially
make trademarks, and therefore packaging and labelling
of risk products, a covered investment protected under
IIAs [65]. The meaning of ‘indirect expropriation’ is also
highly debated [17], the details of which are further
explored in Supplementary Text III which provides a
review of the literature on IIAs investment protection
obligations relevant to risk commodity regulatory space.
Additionally, Cooper and colleagues (2014) point out
that arbitration panels are required to interpret IIA rules
based on the agreement’s overall purpose and objectives
outlined in the preamble [66]. Unless health protection
provisions are included in the preamble or within the
body of the agreement, Hawkins and Holden (2016) fur-
ther highlight that arbitrators have “no obligation to bal-
ance trade and investment liberalisation against other
competing social goods” [12]. In disputes brought under
NAFTA for example, arbitrators were required to inter-
pret investor rights under the Investment Chapter in the
context of NAFTA’s overall objectives which were en-
tirely commercial, although the preamble did include
resolutions to preserve states’ flexibility to safeguard
public welfare [66]. While NAFTA also included a
provision within Article 1101 that appeared to carve out
public health measures from liability under the investment
protection chapter, these measures were required to be
“otherwise consistent” with the chapter [66]. Cooper and
colleagues argue that as a result, Article 1101 had “not
effectively shielded many public interest measures, nor
deterred investors from bringing claims” [66].
Overall, the vagueness of substantive rules and broad
protection offered to corporations in IIAs may contrib-
ute further to the uncertainty for governments in asses-
sing a measure’s potential to trigger an investor-state
dispute. A number of sources identified that this may
encourage governments to take a risk-averse approach
and pursue a weakened regulation or refrain from regu-
lating entirely, including for measures that would in fact
be compliant with international investment law [16, 55,
59, 67]. In their analysis of ISDS and regulatory chill,
Tienhaara broadly stated that “substantial ambiguity ex-
ists in the text of the TPP(A). Ambiguity equals regula-
tory uncertainty and thus regulatory chill remains a
concern.” [68].
Inconsistency in interpretation of international investment
rules
A number of legal analyses found investment law inter-
pretation and arbitral outcomes in cases with relevance
to public health have been somewhat unpredictable and
inconsistent, and point out that this makes it challenging
for governments to assess their risk of attracting or los-
ing an investor-state dispute [57, 58, 69]. A 2013 UNCT
AD report observed “divergent legal interpretations of
identical or similar treaty provisions and differences in
the assessment of the merits of cases involving the same
facts” [70]. Two examples identified that reflect incon-
sistency in ISDS rulings include Chemtura Corp Vs
Canada and Tecmed Vs Mexico. In 1998 Chemtura
Corp filed an investor-state dispute against Canada ar-
guing NAFTA violations regarding a ban on the use of
lindane, a hazardous pesticide [71]. The arbitration panel
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rejected Chemtura’s case stating that "[T] he rule of
Chapter 11 Tribunal is not to second-guess the correctness
of the science-based decision-making of highly specialized
regulatory agencies" [71]. In contrast, Tecmed filed an ISDS
claim against Mexico in 2003 for revoking their permit to
operate a landfill due to violation of various health and en-
vironmental regulations. In this case the arbitration panel
stated "we find no principle stating that regulatory adminis-
trative actions are per se excluded from the scope of the
Agreement, even if they are beneficial to society as a whole
—such as environmental protection" [67].
Various analyses identified a number of different fac-
tors that likely contribute to the inconsistency in past
dispute decisions. First, unlike for international trade,
Sapiro (2015) points out that there is no single IIA pro-
tecting foreign investors and no single multilateral insti-
tution that governs international investment policy or
arbitration [57]. Consequently, governments have devel-
oped investment law on an ad hoc basis from which cus-
tomary international law has emerged [57]. Additionally,
a number of articles highlighted that the interpretation
of relatively vague IIA obligations is left to the discretion
of each arbitration panel [17, 53, 57] and panels are not
obligated to base their decisions on previous dispute de-
cisions [13, 17, 58]. This leads to different interpreta-
tions of the law and different assessment of cases
involving the same facts, in turn generating competing
case law which provides the basis for future tribunals to
continue to reach different conclusions in almost identi-
cal cases [58, 60, 63]. For example, Johnson (2017)
points out that while Australia’s win on jurisdiction
made it more politically viable for other states to also
introduce similar standardized tobacco packaging regu-
lations, future tribunals are not required to follow previ-
ous decisions, and therefore tobacco companies may
pursue investment arbitration for similar regulations
elsewhere [69]. Various analyses also argued that uncer-
tainty may be compounded by the lack of an appeal
mechanism in investment arbitration through which
parties can seek review of the interpretation of a law [16,
60, 63, 69, 72]. Further, investment arbitration proceed-
ings have historically been criticised for a “lack of trans-
parency and access” [17]. A number of analyses
suggested that a combination of these factors make it
challenging for governments to evaluate the compliance
of a proposed regulation with their investment obliga-
tions, creating uncertainty that may contribute to a chill-
ing effect on certain public health-relevant regulatory
development [16, 58, 67].
Cost of investment arbitration
The high costs associated with defending against an in-
vestor’s claim may also make investment arbitration a
powerful tool for THCCs to generate a chilling effect on
domestic health regulation, particularly in the context of
inequitable financial resources between corporations and
states. While arbitration panels don’t have the authority
to order the reversal of regulations, they can award mon-
etary compensation to investors covering the estimated
damage resulting from expropriation and loss of profits
[53]. In their analysis of investor compensation in ISDS
cases, Bonnitcha and Brewin (2020) point out that coun-
tries tend to face exaggerated investor claims for such
damages with actual awards averaging roughly 40% of
the amount originally claimed [73]. Actual awards aver-
aged US$250 million between 2010 and 2020 and there
are approximately 50 known cases of awards over USD
100 million, including eight cases where awards were
more than USD 1 billion [73]. The largest individual
award of compensation to date is USD 40 billion
awarded in Hulley vs. Russia (the largest of several re-
lated claims arising out of the nationalization of the
Yukos Oil Company, in which a total of USD 50 billion
was awarded) [73]. Other studies report that even if a
government is confident that they can win a dispute, ex-
perienced investment lawyers cost millions regardless of
the outcome [72, 74, 75]. The literature widely reported
that on average an investment arbitration case costs up-
wards of US$8 million for a defending state, of which
legal fees account for approximately 80% [60, 63, 69, 71,
76, 77]. Jarman (2019) reported that in Phillip Morris Vs
Uruguay the defendants incurred expenses of US$28.5
million however this was reimbursed when the tribunal
dismissed the claims [17]. Various analyses suggest that
the chilling effect on a regulation due to the cost of arbi-
tration may occur regardless of a government’s percep-
tion of their ability to successfully defend proposed
legislation [13, 52, 55, 63, 69, 78].
Only anecdotal evidence was identified supporting the
theory that high cost of investment arbitration can con-
tribute to regulatory chill. Three included articles re-
ported that Uruguay’s government acknowledged it was
only able to defend itself against Phillip Morris Interna-
tional’s challenge after receiving support from Bloom-
berg Philanthropies to finance their legal team [13, 61,
79]. In 2002, Indonesia granted exemptions from an
open-pit mining ban in protected forest areas to a list of
13 companies after they threatened to initiate arbitration
against the state [16, 67]. Shekhar (2016) reported that
the Indonesian government claimed they did not have
the finances to pay the compensation to investors [67].
Biased arbitration panels
Uncertainty in predicting the outcome of investor-state
disputes may also be exacerbated by both explicit and
implicit bias (real or perceived) in arbitral rulings [80].
Arbitration panels are composed of three arbitrators,
each party appoints one and the third is jointly
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appointed. Each arbitrator is compensated by parties to
the dispute on a case-by-case basis without secure ten-
ure. A number of articles/reports included in this review
identified concerns over potential arbitrator conflict of
interest, the independence of arbitrators and explicit bias
created by the system [57, 58, 65, 81]. Hawkins and
Holden (2016) argue that if an arbitrator interprets pro-
visions in such a manner as to favour investors, they
may promote future use of the ISDS mechanism by for-
eign investors [12] and others suggest investors may be
more likely to appoint that arbitrator in future arbitra-
tion [16, 63]. Conversely, if an arbitrator develops a
reputation for ruling in favour of states, they may be
more likely to be repeatedly appointed by defending
states. Additionally, Langford and colleagues (2017)
point out that arbitral appointment is heavily influenced
by legal counsel which creates potential for special fa-
vours [82].
A number of analyses suggest implicit bias in the arbi-
tration system may arise since lawyers are free to rotate
between roles as legal counsel and arbitrators in differ-
ent cases [57, 63, 72]. This so-called ‘double hatting’ has
been empirically confirmed to have persisted over time
amongst a very small elite group of actors [82]. Double-
hatting was mentioned as problematic in two articles
since when making a decision as arbitrator in one dis-
pute, it may be difficult not to be influenced (consciously
or subconsciously) by the arguments made as counsel in
another dispute with similar legal issues [72, 82]. Fur-
ther, a number of analyses point out that arbitrators are
experienced international trade and investment lawyers,
nearly all from HICs and typically have no expertise in
public policy which may contribute to an implicit bias
towards foreign investors [16, 55, 63]. A number of arbi-
trators have also served as members of boards of multi-
national corporations creating significant conflict of
interest issues [60].
We identified mixed empirical evidence for bias in arbi-
tral rulings. One 2016 analysis of 197 ISDS cases involving
LMIC defendants from the UNCTAD database before
September 2016 found that arbitral panels overall were
not more likely to rule in favour of the claimant with a ra-
tio of investor wins over state wins of 0.89 [83]. The study
did find evidence that panels identified a priori as biased
towards investors were more likely to rule against LMIC
respondents but the same biased rulings were not found
in disputes involving HICs [83]. Another empirical legal
analysis of trends in legal interpretation in ISDS cases con-
ducted in 2012 found tentative evidence that arbitrators
favour investor claimants over respondent states [84].
Regardless of whether this bias is real or simply perceived,
it may nonetheless create uncertainty for governments in
determining the likely outcome of a potential dispute and
may therefore contribute to a regulatory chilling effect.
Notably, the high revenue gained through investment
arbitration perversely incentivises law firms to promote
the use of investment arbitration and the rise in in-
vestment arbitration annually since the 1990s has, in
part, been attributed to such promotion [85]. Arbitra-
tors have also actively promoted the importance of
the ISDS mechanism to promote foreign investment
and has lobbied against reform [60, 86].
Evidence of regulatory chill
Response chill
Response chill refers to a chilling effect on a specific
proposed or adopted regulatory measure after a govern-
ment becomes aware of the risk of investment arbitra-
tion [12–14]. This can result from the actual initiation
of a dispute, threat of an impending dispute, or per-
ceived threat based on other states’ experience in rela-
tion to similar legislation [71]. Evidence for public health
regulation response chill was primarily identified in indi-
vidual case-studies. Curran and Eckhardt (2017) re-
ported that in the 1990s, the tobacco industry used
NAFTA’s Investment Chapter 11 to argue that Canada’s
proposed tobacco plain packaging regulation equated to
illegal expropriation of its trademark requiring hundreds
of millions of dollars in compensation [87]. Threats of
investment arbitration heavily impacted the Canadian
parliament’s decision to abandon the proposal [87]. Sud
and colleagues (2015) reported that in the early 2000s a
ban on misleading cigarette labelling terms (e.g. ‘light’
and ‘mild’) was also delayed in Canada after Phillip Mor-
ris again argued the ban violated NAFTA [88].
Two sources reported that in 2014, threats of invest-
ment arbitration by the tobacco industry over New Zeal-
and’s proposed plain packaging bill was a key reason
adoption of the bill was delayed [89, 90]. BAT New Zea-
land, for example, claimed the bill was in violation of
New Zealand’s IIA obligations and would entitle the
company to "an arbitral award requiring New Zealand to
repeal the legislation and/or pay substantial sums in
compensation" [90, 91]. It is also relatively widely
claimed in the literature that New Zealand and Thailand
also delayed progress on standardized packaging until
the decision was known in the investor-state case against
Australia [18, 53, 67, 78, 89]. Gruszczynski (2014) identi-
fied this case as one of various factors that delayed the
EU’s draft Tobacco Products Directive and the UK’s
2014 decision not to proceed with plain packaging [53].
Tam and van Walbeek (2014) reported that, in 2012,
BAT attempted to use the Australian legal cases to in-
timidate Namibian officials into not proceeding with
their proposed Tobacco Products Control Act [92].
It is important to note that Australia pursued tobacco
standardized packaging legislation despite industry argu-
ing, among other things, that the measure would violate
Milsom et al. Globalization and Health          (2021) 17:134 Page 9 of 19
their intellectual property rights, expropriate their in-
vestment and not accord them fair and equitable treat-
ment under the Australia-Hong Kong Bilateral
Investment Treaty [93]. This indicates that the threat of
an investor-state dispute is just one of multiple interact-
ing factors influencing policy decisions.
Precedential chill
The potential for state actors to change a regulation in
response to a settled or resolved investor-state dispute
due to concern of future arbitrations based on the same
(or similar) regulation, has been defined as precedential
chill [67, 71]. In this case a state will roll-back progres-
sive public health policy after they or another country
loses/settles an investor-state dispute [71]. One example
that may to some extent reflect this form of regulatory
chill is the 1997 ISDS case of US Ethyl Corporation vs
Canada as reported by Tietje (2014). Ethyl Corporation,
a US company importing and distributing the gasoline
additive MMT in Canada, brought an investment claim
against the Canadian government under NAFTA for
banning MMT imports and inter-provincial trade [71].
After a number of Canadian provinces successfully chal-
lenged the legitimacy of the MMT ban in domestic
courts, the Canadian government decided to settle the
ongoing NAFTA investment dispute by agreeing to pay
Ethyl CAD$20 million and repealed the MMT ban [71].
While some consider the loss in domestic courts was the
primary driver of the Canadian government’s decision to
roll-back the ban, others argue investment dispute-
related concerns may have also played a role [71]. In
2011, Lone Pine Resources initiated a dispute against
Quebec’s revocation of its right to mine for oil and gas
under the St. Lawrence River without compensation
after a moratorium on hydraulic fracking of shale gas
was passed in 2011 due to public health and environ-
mental concerns [71]. While the outcome of the case is
still pending, Tietje points out that some experts are
concerned about it generating regulatory chill [71], “for
example, the director of the Sierra Club’s trade program
claimed in 2013 that ‘If a government is not even
allowed to take a time out to study the impact without
having to compensate a corporation, it puts a tremen-
dous chill on a governments’ ability to regulate in the
public interest.” [71, 94].
Anticipatory chill
Some researchers have raised the concern of anticipatory
chill- that policy-makers may take into account potential
disputes with foreign investors during the policy devel-
opment process, hampering regulatory progress across a
range of public health policy areas [67, 71, 95]. Côté’s
2014 study assessed 50 in-depth interviews complemen-
ted by an electronic survey of 114 of Canadian health
and safety and environmental regulators concluded there
was low level awareness among policymakers of the po-
tential threat of investor-state challenges to regulations
[76]. The study also found that policymakers rarely con-
sidered Canada’s trade and investment obligations when
developing regulations, but when they did, WTO obliga-
tions were of primary concern [76]. Additionally, the
study included in-depth interviews with tobacco control
regulators from 11 countries complemented by 28 elec-
tronic surveys completed by tobacco control regulators
in 28 different countries [76]. The findings here reflected
those found amongst Canadian regulators.
Somewhat in contrast, Van Harten and Scott’s 2016
Canadian case study including 52 key informant inter-
views identified that the Ethyl Corp case described
above “drew much more attention to ISDS” and after
which there was widespread reluctance to develop
policy since it might also trigger litigation under
NAFTA [96]. The study found that various “govern-
ment ministries have changed their decision-making
to account for trade concerns including ISDS” [96].
This included a standardized regulatory impact assess-
ment process for evaluating policy and regulatory
proposals for trade and ISDS risk and generally sig-
nificantly greater involvement of government lawyers
to vet proposals for compliance with trade and invest-
ment rules [96].
Other analyses also reported that internal vetting pro-
cesses for compliance with international trade and invest-
ment obligations had been institutionalized in multiple
other countries. For example Peru, Guatemala, Panama
and the Dominican Republic have adopted formal vetting
processes for any new regulation to consider its trade and
investment implications including a ‘dispute prevention’
mechanism [13]. New Zealand and Australia have adopted
regulatory management regimes that incorporate risk as-
sessment processes assessing policy consistency with
international trade and investment obligations [90]. The
Regulatory Coherence chapter in the CPTPP encourages
parties to establish regulatory impact assessments to en-
sure regulations are necessary, not unacceptably costly,
and evidence-based; a national body for ensuring inter-
departmental consultation and coordination; and estab-
lishes a Committee on Regulatory Coherence comprising
of government officials to promote regulatory coherence
between CPTPP parties [97]. The institutionalization of
such mechanisms has the potential to shift health policy
decision-making power from departments of health to de-
partments of trade or state legal actors from an early stage
of policy development.
Contextual factors
Contextual factors were not a primary unit of analysis in
any of the literature included in this review. However,
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we identified a number of contextual factors, primarily
within case study analyses, that may mediate the ability
of THCCs to promote investment-related policy non-
decisions or ISDS-related regulatory chill. In this section
we tentatively outline these factors and present a synthe-
sis of the supporting evidence. It was not possible to
assess the potency of each factor and generally a com-
bination of factors are likely to be influencing any single
policy/regulatory decision.
Domestic economic conditions
Poorer economic conditions and limited domestic fi-
nance were of the more commonly mentioned factors in
the literature that may increase the likelihood of regula-
tory chill. Behn and colleagues (2018) argue that as ‘rule
takers’ in trade and investment negotiations (due to
their relatively weaker economies), LMICs may be com-
mitted to a more diverse and inconsistent set of invest-
ment rules compared to HICs that tend to be ‘rule
makers’ and therefore able to ensure their IIAs are rela-
tively uniform in content [80]. This combined with
Bernasconi-Osterwalder and colleagues (2012) point that
with limited financial and technical resources to ensure
their regulatory regimes comply with strict and demand-
ing investment protection standards set out in IIAs,
LMICs may be particularly aware of their vulnerability
to legal threats from investors in relation to regulatory
development [72] and therefore reticent to implement
regulatory change even before a threat of investment ar-
bitration is made [72].
A number of analyses raised points that tended to sup-
port the theory that with limited government budgets,
LMICs may also be likely to perceive the potential costs
associated with an investor-state dispute as unacceptably
high. Investor-state disputes typically cost more than
US$1 million annually which would exceed the budget
for tobacco control in many LMICs [61]. In a ruling
against the Czech Republic, an arbitration panel ordered
compensation equivalent to the country’s annual health
budget [12, 58] and in a case against Ecuador investors
claimed the equivalent of 7.5% of annual government ex-
penditure and was eventually awarded 1.92% of it,
greater than government’s annual expenditure on health
[72]. Legal expenses can affect the cost-benefit analysis
of a health measure by increasing the initial costs [49].
Considering these high costs, governments, and particu-
larly LMICs, may be more likely to take a risk averse ap-
proach and refrain from regulating [49, 79, 95].
Level of dependence on foreign investment was also a
contextual factor identified across several analyses. Two
analyses argued that LMICs with major concerns over
unemployment, public and private debt and the need for
economic growth may be more dependent on foreign in-
vestment and therefore may be particularly vulnerable to
investment-related policy non-decisions [9, 81]. Others
made related arguments that some countries may be
particularly concerned that NCD prevention regulations
will affect investors’ profits and/or trigger an investor-
state dispute resulting in the government being per-
ceived as ‘anti-investor’, potentially leading to investor
flight or detracting future foreign investment [16, 89].
One identified example that may support this theory is
that in 2002, in the context of a relatively weak economy
and reliance on the extractive industry, Indonesia backed
down on a proposed ban of open-pit mining after
mining companies threatened investment arbitration
[16, 67]. Brown (2013) also argues that reliance on
foreign aid may make some LMICs more vulnerable to
investment arbitration-induced regulatory chill since
they may not wish to negatively affect their relationship
with an investor’s home state which may be an import-
ant source of financial aid [16].
Domestic technical resources
Without internal legal expertise in international invest-
ment law or the finances to hire expensive international
lawyers, regulators, again particularly in LMICs, may
find it difficult to reasonably evaluate their compliance
with their international investment obligations. This may
result in THCC threats being perceived as more credible
than they actually are. As such, legal capacity constraints
may reduce the political will required for implementa-
tion of a risk commodity regulation [49]. Further, under-
standing their defense would potentially be sub-optimal,
may increase the likelihood that LMICs decides to re-
frain from regulating. While we found no specific evi-
dence to support this theory, two recent studies of
investor-state dispute decisions found tentative empirical
evidence that developing countries are much more likely
to lose a dispute than developed countries [80, 84]. At
the same time, a THCC may presume they would have
an advantage in litigation due to their superior legal sup-
port and may therefore be more likely to bring weak
claims against LMICs [80].
Political conditions
Two articles mentioned the potential for political orien-
tation to affect the likelihood of regulatory chill [23, 81].
Crosbie and Thomson (2019) provide the example of
standardized tobacco packaging where they observe the
“case of New Zealand was similar to the UK where the
centre-right party leadership was cautious, and delayed
enacting standardized packaging [once aware of the
ISDS case against Australia]. In contrast, the centre-left
and left leadership in Australia and Uruguay respectively,
was bold in rejecting the industry legal threats from the
outset” [98]. Notably, some Australian right-wing parties
opposed to standardized packaging used the legal risk of
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introducing such legislation as a reason not to regulate
[89].
Tietje (2014) argues that policy central to a govern-
ment’s mandate seems to be more likely to withstand
legal threats from industry [71]. Taken together, a num-
ber of analyses provided examples supporting this- while
the New Zealand government’s position on standardized
packaging had been ambivalent before Phillip Morris ini-
tiated a dispute with Australia [90], tobacco control was
a key part of the government of Uruguay’s policy plan
[21] and proved critical to withstanding industry legal
threats and eventual investment arbitration [99]. Simi-
larly, in Australia there was strong bipartisan support for
tobacco control [89]. In addition, policy champions/pol-
itical leadership is crucial, as was also seen in the
Australia standardized packaging case [89].
Precedents set by other countries and reputational
concerns appear to also provide a counter force to fear
of investment litigation. For example, after more than a
6 year delay due to concerns over investment arbitration
[89], New Zealand’s government brought plain pack-
aging into force in 2018, at least in part to avoid reputa-
tional damage in light of Australia’s progressive
approach to tobacco control [90].
Previous exposure to investment arbitration
High levels of awareness or previous experience with
investor-state disputes may also make a government es-
pecially reluctant to engage in a dispute [95]. However,
the very limited evidence relevant to this theory is
mixed. Van Harten and Scott’s 2016 Canadian case study
identified that concerns of investment litigation over
new regulations was more pronounced after a ministry
had been involved in a NAFTA dispute [96]. Weiss
(2013) described a contrasting outcome relating to legis-
lative measures introduced in Slovakia that partly re-
versed the previous privatization of the Slovak health
insurance market. After initiating an investor-state dis-
pute in 2008 over these measures, Achmea B. V, an in-
vestor in the private health insurance sector, was
awarded EUR22 million in compensation by an arbitra-
tion panel in 2012 [60]. In 2009 the government faced a
similar investor-state dispute initiated by the investor
HICEE B. V [60]. These cases however did not appear to
prevent the Slovak government from progressing on le-
gislation to establish a public health insurance scheme.
Further, the government did not abandon this proposal
when faced with yet another investor-state dispute initi-
ated by Achmea in 2013 claiming expropriation of its
stake in a Slovak health insurance company. This is evi-
denced by the state’s decision to proceed to investment
arbitration, which they eventually won in 2014 [100].
Notably, the Slovak Republic repeatedly challenged the
2012 arbitral award to Achmea, first losing in the
German courts in 2016, but ultimately prevailing in the
European Court of Justice which set aside the award in
2018 [101]. This relatively unprecedented legal ruling
may have since increased Slovakia’s (and potentially
other countries’) confidence to pursue similar public
health legislation despite ISDS threats/proceedings.
Industry-related factors
Some evidence synthesized across different analyses in-
dicates that industry legitimacy may play a role in deter-
mining the likelihood of regulatory chill. During the
1990s when the tobacco industry still maintained a de-
gree of legitimacy and political support, its threats of an
investor-state dispute against Australia and Canada over
proposed standardized tobacco packaging were highly
effective and contributed to the regulations being aban-
doned [15, 102]. Twenty years later, when the tobacco
industry had lost political capital and been denorma-
lized, similar threats and pursuit of investment arbitra-
tion against Australia over similar legislation, did not
produce the same direct effect. Johnson (2017) remarks
that currently the UPF and alcohol industries are per-
ceived by governments as important stakeholders in
growing national economies and to address NCDs, and
their products are perceived by the public as not neces-
sarily harmful to health if consumed in moderation [69].
While it remains to be seen, investment arbitration may
therefore be a powerful instrument available to these in-
dustries to prevent or stall food and alcohol regulatory
development. That said, high levels of industry legitim-
acy may mean these industries do not need to resort to
legal threats since they have multiple other effective
tools at their disposal to influence the regulatory
environment.
Thow and colleagues (2015) point out that the real or
perceived economic contribution of an investor may de-
termine their influence in policy decisions [81] and, we
suggest, possibly also their ability to elicit regulatory chill
using the ISDS mechanism. Specific evidence to support
this theory was, however not identified.
Risk commodity-related factors
Regulation of alcohol and unhealthy food (to reduce
consumption) is not supported by an international treaty
and there is relatively limited availability and acceptabil-
ity of scientific evidence for policies to reduce alcohol
abuse or unhealthy diets [69, 103]. There is also a far
broader range of alcohol and unhealthy food products
with differing compositions, and low consumption of
these products does not necessarily have demonstrable
harmful health impacts [69]. For these reasons, it may be
relatively more difficult for host states to prove that food
or alcohol regulatory measures are proportionate and
contribute to legitimate public health objectives [69].
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We suggest these factors may also make governments
more susceptible to ISDS-related policy chill, although
again we identified no evidence to support this theory.
Recommendations
Given the described drivers of international investment-
related policy non-decisions including regulatory chill,
and with consideration of modifiable contextual factors,
various potential recommendations were also identified
through analysis and synthesis of existing literature.
Addressing the political and economic drivers of
investment-related policy non-decisions
Upstream strategies that prevent or at least limit ‘un-
healthy’ investment may be one option for curtailing
THCC’s influence in NCD policy processes. These in-
clude adopting health-orientated conditionalities on FDI
by THCCs for example on fiscal issues, marketing,
product composition and labelling [104]. Other up-
stream options include compulsory health risk assess-
ments for evaluating proposed incentives for FDI in
relevant sectors [4]. However, unless efforts do not also
focus on shifting the dominant belief amongst powerful
economic actors that employment and economic growth
achieved largely via market strategies will address NCDs,
it is unlikely governments will be willing to consider
restricting FDI on health grounds.
International health instruments may be used to shift to-
wards ‘healthier’ investment policy norms. These could in-
clude ensuring THCCs are on a list of sectors excluded
from further investment liberalisation and encouraging
countries, in a non-discriminatory manner, not to promote
or allow any further investment from THCCs unless certain
health conditionalities are met [38]. International health in-
struments may also be used to promote the protection of
health regulatory space in IIAs [17]. For example, guidelines
on controlling tobacco investments (both foreign and do-
mestic) could be incorporated within the FCTC [38].
Limiting investing THCCs’ ability to leverage their
economic contribution to influence domestic health
policy will also require transparent and enforceable rules
governing interactions between THCCs and govern-
ments [105]. Article 5.3 of the FCTC, for example, le-
gally obligates parties to adopt measures that protect
"their public health policies related to tobacco control
from commercial and other vested interests of the to-
bacco industry" [106].
Reforming international investment protection rules and
procedures
Various strategies for reforming international investment
rules that enable THCCs already invested in a country
to use the ISDS mechanism for generating regulatory
chill have also been proposed [49]. The first option is to
simply exclude the ISDS mechanism from IIAs. A num-
ber of countries have already taken assertive action on
this. For example, a number of South American coun-
tries, South Africa, and Indonesia having either refused
to permit the inclusion of ISDS in new TIAs or can-
celled/let lapse existing TIAs containing ISDS [107];
Brazil has concluded a number of Co-operation and
Facilitation Investment Agreements which exclude ISDS
altogether [108]; and 28 EU states have agreed to ter-
minate ISDS arrangements between themselves, com-
mitted to exclude ISDS from any of its current
negotiations, proposed replacing ISDS with an Invest-
ment Court System modelled after the WTO dispute
resolution system with appointed permanent judges and
an appellate mechanism [109].
Including general health exceptions in future IIAs and
investment chapters in trade agreements is one of many
‘softer’ options. However, it may do little to reduce liti-
gation bought by corporations since it still requires
states to provide an affirmative defense [61] and some
legal analysts argue that protection of investor rights
usually trumps provisions protecting health policy space
[66]. For example, although NAFTA’s Investment
Chapter contained provisions affirming the right of gov-
ernments to protect public health, the measures needed
to be "otherwise consistent with this Chapter", essentially
rendering the public health protection article redundant
[66]. Similarly worded exceptions are included in the in-
vestment chapters of the recently signed agreement be-
tween Canada and the EU (CETA) [17]. The CPTPP
(and previously drafted TPPA) include in Annex 9.B that
"non-discriminatory regulations … designed for legitim-
ate public welfare objectives", including health and the
environment, "do not constitute indirect expropriation,
except in rare circumstances" [64]. This seems to protect
regulatory space against disputes based on indirect
expropriation [75]. However, as others have pointed
out, without defining ‘rare circumstances’ or what
constitutes a ‘legitimate public welfare objective’, in-
terpretation remains somewhat open [52, 61, 75, 86]
and public health measures including tobacco, alcohol
and food regulations could still be considered as com-
pensable indirect expropriation [52].
Complete carve outs (or exclusions) for specific areas
of investment from IIA obligations is another rules-
based option [110]. A specific carve-out of tobacco
control measure is included in the CPTPP text [64], al-
though there are concerns this may undermine the pro-
tection of other health areas under general health
exceptions and an overall regulatory carve-out or
strengthening of the general exception may be a better ap-
proach [111]. For example the Peru-Australia Free Trade
Agreement clarifies that ‘no claim may be brought under
this Section [ISDS] in relation to a measure that is
Milsom et al. Globalization and Health          (2021) 17:134 Page 13 of 19
designed and implemented to protect or promote public
health’ [112, 113]. While this may be possible for tobacco,
for both political and issue complexity reasons, it may not
be possible to do the same for alcohol and UPFs [4, 111].
Clarifying the meaning of key terms/obligations to
limit the use of ISDS by investors and interpretation by
arbitral panels is also needed. For example one strategy
to clarify foreign investor’s ‘legitimate expectations’
could be to develop a national policy for products harm-
ful to health clarifying that foreign investors cannot rea-
sonably expect the host country not to progressively
advance public health measures in these areas [4]. In the
CPTPP’s Investment Chapter the Fair and Equitable
Treatment Provision clarifies that an investor’s expect-
ation’ by itself is insufficient grounds on which to sue
for loss or damages [64]. The CPTPP’s (and previous
draft TPPA’s) Investment Chapter also attempts to clar-
ify the meaning and restrict the application of indirect
expropriation. Annex 9-B refers to indirect expropriation
as "an action or series of actions by a Party [that] has an
effect equivalent to direct expropriation without formal
transfer of title or outright seizure" [64, 86]. A footnote
to Annex 9B attempts to clarify that "[f] or greater
certainty, whether an investor’s investment-backed ex-
pectations are reasonable depends, to the extent rele-
vant, on factors such as whether the government
provided the investor with binding written assurances
and the nature and extent of governmental regulation
or the potential for government regulation in the
relevant sector" [64, 86].
Procedural improvements to the ISDS mechanism should
also be sought to reduce the exposure of governments to
ISDS and the uncertainty they face in relation to potential
investment arbitration. These could include requiring in-
vestors to first exhaust domestic courts before proceeding
to an international tribunal; giving the states involved in a
dispute the right to issue binding interpretations of ISDS
provisions; making it easier to dismiss frivolous claims; in-
creasing openness and transparency of proceedings; assert-
ing the right for a state to deny an investor protection
under an IIA if they fail to comply with their obligations,
which should include the human right to health; allowing
states to file a counterclaim in response to a primary in-
vestor dispute filed by an investor for any violations of their
obligations; and prohibiting arbitrators from working as
lawyers on investment disputes [57, 114]. As proposed by
the EU, establishing a permanent international investment
court system with tenured judges and an appeal process
could promote the development of a "more coherent body
of jurisprudence on substantive and procedural inter-
national investment law" and eliminate the potential bias of
ad-hoc arbitration panels [57]. Adopting a ‘loser pays’
principle could also help prevent regulatory chill directly as-
sociated with the high cost of investment arbitration.
Post-treaty adoption strategies to reduce the risk of
regulatory chill
Where policymakers lack understanding of their coun-
try’s investment protection obligations, threat of an in-
vestment dispute, or desire to avoid such a threat, may
generate regulatory chill, even when a health regulation
is in fact IIA compliant. Downstream, post-treaty adop-
tion strategies to reduce the risk of regulatory chill in-
clude, therefore, close collaboration between and
capacity-building within health, trade, and legal depart-
ments to ensure policymakers can recognise spurious
ISDS threats and are confident in pursuing health regu-
lations that are already IIA compliant. Given the com-
plexity of many countries’ IIA obligations, ongoing
specialist legal advice is also essential to maintain gov-
ernment confidence after threats of an investor-state dis-
pute. In Australia’s standardized packaging case, legal
scholars provided sound legal advice to the government
emphasizing their right to adopt this regulation [89]. Ex-
ternal technical and financial support will be important
for many LMICs facing investment arbitration as was
observed when Uruguay’s government made the decision
to defend its tobacco health warning labels regulation in
an investor-state dispute only after receiving external
support [99].
Additionally, developing capacity within health depart-
ments to design regulations that effectively address pub-
lic health objectives but are also IIA-compliant, reduces
the risk of a successful ISDS challenge. Again, this re-
quires close collaboration between health, trade and
legal departments both before and throughout the policy
development process. Collaboration of this nature was
observed in Canada and Brazil when developing their to-
bacco additives bans and in Australia during the devel-
opment of their standardized packaging regulation to
ensure compliance with their trade and investment
obligations and to pre-empt industry opposition [89,
102, 103]. However, this level of cooperation between
trade and health actors was only considered possible
when export interests were not an issue [103]. Further, it
is important to assert that health regulations should be
designed primarily to protect and promote health with
minimizing the risk of an investment (or trade) chal-
lenge a secondary concern. We acknowledge however,
that close collaboration between health and trade de-
partments may have the potential to contribute to an an-
ticipatory chilling effect on health policy where policy
effectiveness is diluted to ensure IIA compliance.
International health instruments, particularly legally
binding agreements, may give governments the confi-
dence to pursue public health regulations despite threats
of investment arbitration. The FCTC again played a clear
role in prompting Australia to adopt standardized pack-
aging legislation and gave the government confidence it
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could withstand an investor-state dispute initiated by
Phillip Morris [89]. Further, some legal experts argue a
consistent and recurring use of the FCTC by trade and
investment dispute tribunals has resulted in the norma-
tive integration of the FCTC into the investor-state
dispute process [115], which may also contribute to
governments’ future confidence in adopting FCTC
regulations.
Mobilization of transnational public health advocacy
networks that include a wide range of actors, has
been critical in promoting policy action despite the
risk of legal action [23, 66, 81, 89, 99, 102]. During
Australia’s ISDS case over its standardized tobacco
packaging legislation, a tobacco control advocacy net-
work extending well beyond the health sector that
had built close trusting relationships over the past
decade with government officials, policymakers and
the media which gave them access to and influence
within decision-making spaces at that crucial time
[99]. In Van Harten and Scott’s 2016 Canadian case
study, a number of stakeholders also identified public
health and environmental group support as important
for preventing regulatory chill in response to a threat-
ened investor claim under NAFTA over a proposed
ban on cosmetic use of pesticides [96]. Similarly in
the Pac Rim mining companies case against El Salva-
dor, local community groups organized and pressured
the government not to approve the mine for the pro-
tection of the local communities’ health and the en-
vironment [16], this may have contributed to the
government’s decision to proceed to arbitration which
was ultimately decided in their favour.
Strategies used by advocacy networks to reduce
regulatory chill also include influencing issue inter-
pretation through dissemination of strategic framing.
Australia’s tobacco control advocates consistently
framed standardized packaging as beneficial both eco-
nomically and for public health, highlighted the
unique harms of tobacco and the child protection
imperative [89]. They also emphasized Australia’s
international legal commitment to the FCTC and exposed
the patterns of manipulative industry legal attacks [89].
Importantly, they avoided engaging in debates about
claimed investment treaty breaches and advised politicians
to do the same. Together these efforts were credited by
health policymakers as important contributors to avoiding
regulatory chill [89].
Discussion
This review found that THCCs may be incentivised to
threaten or pursue an investor-state dispute since the
costs may be outweighed by the benefits (even of simply
delaying regulatory adoption) and since this effect tends
to ripple out across jurisdictions. Drivers of regulatory
chill may include ambiguity in treaty terms, inconsist-
ency in arbitral rulings, potential arbitrator bias and the
high cost of arbitration. While THCCs have recently re-
ceived unfavourable outcomes in investor-state disputes
relating to tobacco control regulation, evidence indicates
ISDS can make innovation costly for governments and
delay policy adoption both within the country directly
involved but also in other jurisdictions. Additionally,
governments are taking pre-emptive action for example
by adopting standard assessments of public health regu-
latory proposals for trade and investment dispute risk.
Various economic, political and industry-related factors
likely interact to increase (or decrease) the ultimate risk
of regulatory chill.
While regulatory chill-related analysis is an emer-
ging area of research, comparatively very limited em-
pirical research primarily analysing the broader
political and economic dimensions of international
investment-related NCD policy non-decisions was
identified. However, there was some case study evi-
dence indicating that THCCs do take advantage of
governments’ prioritization of foreign investment over
NCD prevention objectives to influence the NCD pre-
vention regulatory environment.
Over the longer term, promoting the adoption of
many of the recommendations outlined in this review
requires that public health policymakers vastly increase
their capacity to actively engage with investment policy
development and agreement negotiations. While
scholars have advocated for departmental capacity-
building through technical training on the linkages be-
tween trade and health, and coordination between trade
and health departments [99, 102, 116–118], evidence
presented in this review indicates such processes may be
equally important to promote health objectives in invest-
ment policymaking.
Driving policy change will also require health advo-
cates adopt discursive strategies that promote a shift in
the way FDI, THCCs and NCDs are perceived, particu-
larly by dominant economic actors and the public. Shap-
ing perceptions of industry legitimacy through actor and
issue framing is one such strategy. Tobacco control ad-
vocates have illustrated that industry delegitimization
(e.g. by exposing unhealthy and nefarious industry
practices, emphasizing the public health, social and
economic burden of health harmful products, and de-
normalizing THCCs) can help shift perceptions and ul-
timately policymaking norms towards prioritizing health
over foreign investment and excluding investors from
health policy decision-making spaces [17, 89]. This in-
cludes by enshrining these norms within both inter-
national health and investment agreements. Notably
though, in a number of tobacco-producing countries,
the economic imperative remains dominant and industry
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influence substantial. Further, due to issue complexity,
shifting perceptions and norms relating to UPFs and al-
cohol regulation will be an even greater challenge.
Norm-shifting may also increase the likelihood that a
government will withstand threats of ISDS from THCCs
[89] and investment arbitration panels may be influ-
enced by such norms in their rulings. For example, in
the Uruguay case the panel commented that several
modern IIAs explain nondiscriminatory regulations with
‘legitimate public welfare objectives’ like public health,
do not constitute indirect expropriation [119].
Limitations
This review has a number of important limitations.
Restricting the review to sources published after 2008
and our limited capacity to undertake multiple second-
ary iterative literature searches in keeping with the real-
ist approach, may have resulted in relevant explanatory
mechanisms and data that supported or challenged
them, not being captured by this review. Also, identifica-
tion and development of explanatory mechanisms may
have been limited due to the very few studies identified
on investment and health policy that explicitly engaged
with political economy theory.
Conclusions
This review finds some evidence of the real potential risk
of NCD prevention regulatory chill and tentatively sug-
gests the contexts in which it may be more likely to
occur. However, international investment-related NCD
prevention policy non-decisions driven by broader polit-
ical and economic factors may well be more widespread
and restrictive of NCD prevention regulatory environ-
ments. As such, there is a clear need for research that
explores the more political and economic dimensions of
how international investment liberalization may shape
actor interests and priorities in ways that affect NCD
policy. This will require empirical studies that engage
with theories and approaches from international rela-
tions and political science, including political economy
and power analyses.
The findings of this review indicate the need for a
broader research agenda on the implications of foreign
investment on NCD policy and objectives. Such an
agenda should include regulatory chill-specific questions
already posed by others [23, 120] such as how does the
perceived risk of an investor-state dispute or direct chal-
lenge by foreign investors affect health policymaker’s de-
cisions?; but also questions that investigate the broader
political and economic drivers of investment-related
NCD policy non-decisions, for example, what are the
barriers to greater coherence between investment and
NCD policy and objectives?
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